Abstract: Are market-based or bank-based financial systems better at financing the expansion of industries that depend heavily on external finance, facilitating the formation of new firms, and improving the efficiency of capital allocation? We find evidence for neither the market-based nor the bank-based hypothesis. Focusing on underdeveloped economies or R&D-based industries or labor-intensive industries does not alter this conclusion. While effective legal protection of outside investors and overall financial development boosts new firm formation and industry growth, having a bank-based or market-based system per se does not seem to matter much.
Introduction
Financial economists have debated the relative merits of bank-based and market-based financial systems for over a century. 1 Many authors stress the advantages that banks have over markets in financing the expansion of existing firms and in promoting the establishment of new firms. Others, however, emphasize the comparative merits of markets. Historically, empirical research on the bank-based versus market-based debate has centered on Germany and Japan as bank-based systems and the United States and Great Britain as market-based financial systems. This work has produced illuminating insights concerning the operation of financial systems in these countries. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to draw broad conclusions about bank-based and market-based financial systems from only four countries. To ameliorate this shortcoming, we have compiled a new, broad cross-country database with measures of financial structure, i.e., the degree to which countries have bank-based or market-based financial systems.
To assess the comparative benefits of market-based and bank-based financial systems, this paper examines industrial expansion and new firm creation across a large sample of countries. More specifically, we first assess whether industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in bank-based or market-based financial systems. Second, we test whether new firms are more likely to form in a bank-based or market-based financial system. Third, we conduct a number of extensions of these core questions.
Specifically, we examine whether the impact of financial structure on industrial growth and new firm formation depends on (i) the level of economic development, (ii) whether the industries are R&D-intensive, and (iii) whether industries are more labor-intensive. We also assess whether market-based systems are more effective at redirecting the flow of investment from declining industries to growing ones. This is the first paper to concentrate on specific mechanisms through which financial structure influences industrial performance and firm creation in a broad cross-section of countries.
In examining new firm formation and industry growth across different financial systems, this paper sheds empirical light on the bank-based view, the market-based view, and two new theories that reject the centrality of the market versus bank-based debate. In what follows, we note the differences among these views but also highlight that many theories stress the particular circumstances under which banks or markets are most effective at boosting economic performance.
The bank-based view highlights the positive role of banks in financing industrial expansion and promoting new firm formation. 2 For instance, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that banks promote industrial growth in under-developed economies with weak institutions more effectively than markets: powerful banks can more effectively induce firms to reveal information and pay debts than atomistic markets that rely on efficient legal systems (Rajan and Zingales, 1999) . Furthermore, Stulz (2000) argues that banks are more effective in providing external resources to new firms that require staged financing because banks can credibly commit to making additional funding available as the project develops. 3 Thus, under some conditions, bank-based systems may be more effective than market-based systems in providing external finance and promoting the formation of new, innovative enterprises.
The market-based view not only stresses the positive role of markets, it highlights the comparative advantages of markets over banks in effectively allocating capital. 4 Proponents of the market-based view emphasize that powerful banks frequently stymie innovation and competition. First, by acquiring inside information about firms, powerful banks can extract informational rents from firms [Hellwig, 1991] . The banks' market power reduces the incentives of firms to undertake profitable projects since banks extract a large share of the profits [Rajan, 1992] . By encouraging competition, market-based systems create greater incentives for the growth of new, innovative firms. Second, bankers tend to be ineffective corporate controllers due to their insider status. Specifically, bankers often hold equity and vote the shares of other shareholders in bank-based systems. Thus, bankers might collude with managers against other outside investors and thereby thwart competition [Hellwig, 1998; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998 ]. Third, banks -as debt issuers -have an inherent bias toward conservative investments, so that bank-based systems stymie innovation and growth. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) find evidence of this in Japan. Also, in the absence of sound, market price signals, banks might continue financing established firms with low-return projects [Rajan and Zingales, 1999] . Thus, some theories stress the advantages of market-based systems. Specifically, markets thwart the negative repercussions of excessively powerful banks and promote the formation and expansion of innovative, more R&D-based industries [Allen, 1993] .
The financial services view argues that the bank-based versus market-based debate is of second-order importance. According to this view, both banks and markets arise to ameliorate information and transactions costs and thereby improve capital allocation. In comparing countries, the first-order issue is the ability of the financial system to ameliorate information and transaction costs, not whether banks or markets provide these services. Furthermore, banks and markets might act as complements in providing financial services [Boyd and Smith 1998; Huybens and Smith 1999; Stulz 2000] . According to the financial services view, it is not bank-based or market-based systems per se, but rather the overall level of financial development that stimulates the flow of external funds to worthy firms and the creation of new firms.
The law and finance view [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000] emphasizes the role of the legal system in determining the level of financial development. The law and finance view argues that legal systems that protect outside investors and enforce contracts effectively boost financial development and thereby facilitate external finance, new firm formation, and efficient capital allocation. Although the law and finance view is not inconsistent with the market-based, bank-based, or financial-services views, the law and finance view clearly emphasizes the role of the law in producing well-functioning banks and markets and de-emphasizes the bank-based versus market-based distinction. Thus, the law and finance view predicts that the component of financial development defined by the legal system critically influences the expansion of existing firms and the formation of new ones.
To evaluate the predictions of the bank-based, market-based, financial services, and law and finance views, we use a panel of 42 countries and 36 industries over the 1980s. Rajan and Zingales (1998, henceforth RZ) show that industries that are externally dependent -industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance -grow relatively faster in economies with higher levels of financial development. Unlike RZ and Cetorelli and Gamberra (2000) , however, we examine the market versus bank-based debate along with the financial services and law and finance views. Thus, as a first step, we examine whether externally dependent industries grow faster in market-or bank-based financial systems, or whether it is the overall level of financial development that enhances the growth of externally dependent industries. We also assess whether the legal system plays a critical role in producing a financial system that fosters the growth of externally dependent firms. In a second step, we decompose industry growth into the growth of the number of establishments and the growth of the average size of establishments. Thus, we assess whether bank-based or market-based financial systems are better at fostering new firm formation or existing firm expansion, or whether it is the overall level of financial development that is critical for the emergence of new firms and the expansion of existing ones. Moreover, we also examine whether the legal system plays the pivotal role in establishing the financial conditions for both new firm formation and the expansion of old firms. In a third step, we consider more complex views of financial structure. Specifically, we study whether the optimal mix of banks and markets for funding industry and promoting firm formation depends on the level of economic development. We assess whether financial structure influences R&D-intensive -and labor-intensive --industries differently. Moreover, we test whether the mix of banks and markets influences the efficiency of capital allocation between industries within in a country. Finally, since public ownership of banks represents an important distinguishing characteristic of financial systems across countries, we examine the impact of public ownership of banks on industrial success, new firm formation, and inter-industry investment efficiency.
The results give no support to either the market-or bank-based view. Industries that depend heavily on external finance do not grow faster in either bank-based or market-based financial systems. The results are supportive of the financial services and the law and finance views. Industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of overall financial development. Industries that depend heavily on external finance also grow comparatively faster in economies where legal codes protect the rights of outside investors and where the legal system effectively enforces those codes. We then decompose the industry growth rates into the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in the average size of establishments. We again find that there is not a robust relationship between the degree to which a country has a bank-based or market-based financial system and the rate of new firm formation or existing firm expansion. In contrast, overall financial development explains cross-country variation in the growth in the number of establishments. Similarly, the legal environment governing financial contracting helps explain cross-country variation in the growth in the number of establishments. Neither overall financial development nor the legal environment, however, is significantly associated with the growth in the average size of establishments. Thus, overall financial development and the legal environment are critically important for new firm creation, which is consistent with Schumpeter's view of the role of the financial system in fostering creative destruction [King and Levine 1993] .
After extending the analyses to encompass broader -more "nuanced" -views of financial structure and after conducting a number of sensitivity checks, the results continue to provide no support for either the market-or bank-based view. Specifically, we find no evidence to support the view that bank-based systems are particularly important for industrial growth or new firm creation in less-developed economies. We find no evidence that R&D-based or labor-intensive industries perform systematically better or worse in bank-based or market-based financial systems. Furthermore, we do not find that financial structure influences the degree to which countries increase investment in growing industries and decrease investment in declining ones. Thus, while overall financial development stimulates the flow of funds to externally dependent firms, promotes new firm creation, and facilitates the reallocation of investment from declining to expanding industries, the degree to which the financial system is bank-based or market-based is not a particularly useful way to distinguish financial systems. This paper's results on financial structure also hold after conducting a battery of robustness checks that use alternative measures of financial structure, financial development, and external dependence. Finally, we extend the conception of financial structure to include the degree of public ownership of banks. Consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) , we find that public ownership of banks hurts overall financial development with negative implications on industrial growth, new firm formation, and the efficiency of capital allocation. This paper is importantly different from two recent papers on financial structure and economic growth. Levine (2000b) shows that financial structure is not a good predictor of growth in a cross-country growth framework: neither bank-based nor market-based financial systems are closely associated with economic growth. He, however, examines Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. He does not examine whether financial structure influences new firm creation, existing firm expansion, or external financing, which is this paper's focus. Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2000) use firm-level data and also show that financial structure is not a robust predictor of economic growth. Again, however, they do not examine whether financial structure influences new firm creation or existing firm expansion, which are two channels highlighted by the theoretical literature discussed above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric model that we use to evaluate the comparative ability of the (1) bank-based, (2) market-based, (3) financial services, and (4) law and finance views to explain industrial expansion and new firm creation. Section 3 presents the data.
Section 4 provides the empirical results. Section 5 extends the analysis by considering differences in highand low-income countries, the importance of industry-R&D, the degree of industry labor-intensity, the efficiency of capital allocation, and the extent of public ownership of banks. Section 6 presents sensitivity analyses and section 7 concludes.
Methodology
Financial intermediaries and markets help overcome market frictions that drive a wedge between the price of external and internal finance. Lower costs of external finance facilitate firm growth and new firm formation. Therefore, industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance should benefit disproportionately more from greater financial development than industries that are not naturally heavy users of external finance. RZ (1998) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that industries that rely more heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with a better-developed financial system. They use data on a panel of 42 countries and 36 industries over the 1980s. Furthermore, RZ show that the effect of financial development on the industrial growth runs mostly through growth in the number of establishments rather than through growth in the average size of establishments. So financial development improves disproportionately the prospects of young firms in industries that rely heavily on external finance. This paper explores whether industries with a high need of external finance grow faster in economies with bank-or market-based financial systems. Furthermore, we assess the financial services and law and finance views. Specifically, we study whether (1) the overall level of financial development and (2) the legal codes and enforcement mechanisms governing financial transactions importantly determine industrial growth patterns. Following RZ, we then decompose industry growth into the growth in the average size of establishments and the growth in the numbers of establishments to evaluate the importance of the degree to which financial systems are bank-based or market-based, financial development and its legal determinants for the sources of growth. For conciseness, we use the term "financial structure" to refer to the degree to which a country's financial system is bank-based or market based. We define our indicators of financial structure in such a way that higher values imply a more market-based system. Econometrically, we use the following regression to assess the impact of financial development and financial structure on industry growth.
where Growth i,k is the average annual growth rate of value added, the growth in number of firms or the growth in average size of firms, in industry k and country i. Country and Industry are country and industry dummies, respectively, and Share i,k is the share of industry k in manufacturing in country i in 1980.
External k is the measure of dependence on external finance for industry k as measured for a sample of U.S.
companies over the period 1980-89. FD i and FS i are indicators of financial development and financial structure for country i, respectively. We interact the external dependence of an industry ( External) with both (a) a measure of overall financial development (FD) and (b) an index of the degree of market-based versus bank-based, i.e., an index of financial structure ( FS). 5 The dummy variables for industries and countries correct for country and industry specific characteristics that might determine industry growth patterns. We thus isolate the effect that the interaction of external dependence and financial development/structure has on industry growth rates relative to country and industry means. By including the ini tial share of an industry we control for a convergence effect; we expect industries with a large share to grow more slowly, and therefore a negative sign on γ. 6
The different hypotheses imply different predictions about the sign and significance of δ 1 and δ 2 . The market-based view predicts that industries that are dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with market-oriented financial systems and higher levels of financial development, thus implying δ 1 >0 and δ 2 >0. The bank-based view predicts that industries that are dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with bank-oriented financial systems and higher levels of financial development, thus implying δ 1 >0 and δ 2 <0. The financial-services view predicts that industries dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with a higher level of overall financial development, whereas the financial structure should not matter, thus implying δ 1 >0 and δ 2 =0. The law and finance view predicts that industries dependent on external finance grow faster in economies that protect the rights of outside investors more efficiently, whereas financial structure should not matter. If we replace FD i with indicators of these legal rights and contract enforcement, this implies δ 1 >0 and δ 2 =0.
We run both Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regressions and Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS)
regressions. TSLS regressions allow us to address the issue of endogeneity of independent variables.
Specifically, we want to control for the possible endogeneity of the level and the structure of financial development. Whereas the above equation suggests that an exogenously given level or structure of financial sector activity might interact with the external dependence of industries to determine industry growth rates, financial markets and institutions might have arisen due to a given industrial structure.
By using appropriate instruments we can control for simultaneity bias and reverse causality. We will use the legal origin and the religious composition of countries as instrumental variables for the level and structure of financial sector development. Legal systems with European origin can be classified into four major legal families [Reynolds and Flores, 1996] : the English common law and the French, German, and Scandinavian civil law countries. Most countries have acquired their legal systems through occupation and colonialism, so that the legal origin can be regarded as exogenous. Furthermore, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) have shown that the legal origin of a country materially influences its legal treatment of creditors and shareholders, its accounting standards and the efficiency of contract enforcement.
Since these regulatory and informational characteristics determine the efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets, we regard the legal origin of countries as good instruments for financial development. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) also show that the dominant religion of a country influences institutional development. 7
The Data
This section describes the measure of external dependence, the indicators of financial development and structure and the industrial growth data. The data are for 42 countries and 36 industries. All industries are in manufacturing.
External Dependence
The industry-level data on external dependence are from RZ (1998 The drug industry is the industry most dependent on external finance, whereas the tobacco industry has no demand for external finance, i.e. our dependence measure is less than zero. (2000) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) to measure overall financial development. We aggregate data over the period 1980-89. We also construct new measures of financial development, isolating private financial intermediaries, and discuss these results in the sensitivity section below.
Finance-Activity is a measure of the overall activity of the financial intermediaries and markets. It is defined as the log of the product of Private Credit, the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, and Value Traded, the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP. Private Credit is the most comprehensive indicator of the activity of financial intermediaries by including both bank and nonbank intermediaries. Recent work shows that Private Credit exerts a large, positive, robust influence on economic growth . Value Traded measures the activity of the stock market trading volume as a share of national output and thus indicates the degree of liquidity that stock markets provide to economic agents. 8
Finance-Size is a measure of the overall size of the financial sector and is defined as the log of the sum of Private Credit and Market Capitalization. Market Capitalization is defined as the value of listed shares divided by GDP, and is a measure of the size of stock markets relative to the economy. While we include this in our analysis, past work suggests that market capitalization is not a very good predictor of economic performance (Levine and Zervos 1998) .
Finance-Aggregate combines the previous two measures and is thus a conglomerate indicator of the size and activity of the financial sector. Specifically, it is the first principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size.
Finance-Dummy isolates countries that have both underdeveloped financial intermediaries and markets. Specifically, it equals zero if both Private Credit and Value Traded are less than the sample mean and one otherwise.
Indicators of Financial Structure
We also construct measures of the degree to which each country has a market-or bank-based financial system. Since there is not a single accepted definition of financial structure, we use an assortment of different measures to test the robustness of our results. We present the results on four measures of financial structure. Each of these measures is constructed so that higher values indicate more market-based financial systems. Data are averaged over the period 1980-89. Table A2 presents the ranking of countries for the financial structure measures. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) examine the relationship between financial structure and a variety of economic, legal and regulatory variables. Along with many findings, they note that higher income countries tend to have more market-oriented financial systems.
Structure-Activity indicates the activity of stock markets relative to the activity of banks and is defined as the log of the ratio of Value Traded and Bank Credit. Bank Credit equals the claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of GDP. Compared to Private Credit, we exclude claims of nonbank financial intermediaries to thus focus on the commercial banking sector.
Structure-Size indicates the size of stock markets relative to the size of the banking sector and is defined as the log of the ratio of Market Capitalization and Bank Credit.
Structure-Aggregate combines the previous two measures and is thus a conglomerate indicator of the size and activity of stock markets relative to banks. Specifically, it is the first principal component of
Structure-Activity and Structure-Size.
Structure-Dummy is a simple bivariate classification of market-versus bank-based financial systems.
Specifically, it equals one if Structure-Aggregate is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise. An economy can be classified as market-based or bank-based only relative to the other countries in the sample, since there is no absolute measure of market-or bank-based financial systems.
These are the most comprehensive measures of financial structure that have been constructed to date.
Although they do not directly measure the degree to which banks influence industrial expansion and new firm formation or the ability of markets to stimulate the flow of external finance, the measures -when taken together -provide a measure of the comparative role of banks and markets in the economy. Furthermore, the underlying measures of bank development and stock market liquidity exert a strong influence on economic growth. 9 Thus, in terms of economic growth, the basic measures of bank development and stock market liquidity are useful measures. Furthermore, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine (2000) show that countries with strong shareholder rights and high accounting standards tend to have more market-based financial systems.
Thus, key legal and regulatory differences match-up with the measures of financial structure that we use to assess the relationship between industrial performance and degree to which countries are bank-based or market-based.
The Legal Environment
We use three indicators of the rights of outside investors and the degree to which these rights are enforced. These data are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) .
Creditor is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect the claims of secured creditors in the case of reorganization or liquidation of a company. It ranges from zero to four and is the sum of four dummy variables that indicate whether (i) the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on assets, thereby not preventing secured creditors from taking possession of loan collateral, (ii) secured creditors are ranked first in the case of liquidation, (iii) management does not stay in charge of the firm during reorganization, thereby enhancing creditors' power, and (iv) management needs creditors' consent when filing for reorganization. In economies with higher values of Creditor, outside investors have more rights relative to the management and other stakeholders, and should therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that industries need.
Anti-Director is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect minority shareholder rights. It ranges from zero to six and is the sum of six dummy variables that indicate whether (i)
shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting, (iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (iv) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place, (v) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders'
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, and (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders' vote. In economies with higher values of Anti-Director, minority shareholder are better protected against expropriation by management and large shareholders and should therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that industries need. 10
Rule of Law is an assessment of the law and order tradition of a country that ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. This measure was constructed by ICRG and is an average over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . In countries with a higher law and order tradition, outside investors can more easily enforce their claims and rights and should therefore be more willing to provide external finance. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and the correlations for our measures of financial development and structure. There is a large variance in the measures of both financial development and structure. Japan shows the highest value for Finance-Activity and Bangladesh the lowest. Structure-Activity classifies Great
Britain as the most market-based system and Bangladesh as the most bank-based system. We also note that most indicators of financial development are positively correlated with the indicators of financial structure,
i.e. financially more developed economies tend to have market-based systems. Table A1 lists all measures of financial development, structure and the legal indicators for the countries included in our study.
Industry Growth Rates
Our dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of value added. We use the data obtained by RZ from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook database put together by the United Nations Statistical Division (1993) . We also use a decomposition of the industry growth rate. Specifically, we consider the growth in the number of establishments and the average size of establishments. 11 Table 3 lists descriptive statistics and correlations between the three different dependent variables.
We note that the growth rate in the number of establishments is negatively correlated with the growth rate in the average size of firms. This suggests that industries grow either due to the entry of new firms or due to the expansion of existing firms, but not both.
The Results

Financial Development and Industry Growth
We first present the results of regressions of industry growth rates on the interaction of financial development and external dependence. Our regressions differ from those presented by RZ to the extent that (i) our measures of financial development capture both the effects of financial intermediary and stock market development, and (ii) we include the indicators of financial sector development in logs instead of levels to allow for the nonlinearity in the relationship between financial development and growth illustrated by Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) . To make our results comparable to those in RZ, we include the "Differential in real growth rate". This indicates how much faster the industry at the 75th percentile of external dependence (Machinery) would have grown compared to the industry at the 25th percentile (Beverages), if Machinery had been located in the country at the 75th percentile of the respective measure of financial development instead of the country at the 25th percentile. Since U.S data are used to calculate our measure of external dependence, the U.S. is dropped from all regressions.
The results in Table 4 indicate a significantly positive interaction of external dependence and overall financial development on industry growth. The coefficients on the interaction terms of all our indicators of financial sector development and external dependence are significantly positive at the five-percent level.
We start with the top panel and Finance-Activity. The results of the OLS regressions indicate that, for a given industry with a positive external dependence ratio, a higher level of Finance-Activity results in a higher growth rate of this industry. To illustrate the significance of this result, consider the growth differential of 2.3 percent. The coefficient estimate thus predicts that Machinery would grow 2.3 percentage points faster than Beverages, if it were located in Malaysia rather than to Greece. 12 The results in columns 2 through 4 indicate that this result is robust to the use of other measures of financial sector development.
The results of the instrumental variable regressions confirm that the link between external dependence, financial development and industry growth is not due to simultaneity bias or reverse causality (Table 4, bottom panel). We report the regression results using TSLS and the legal origin dummies as instruments for financial sector development. The interaction terms with all three indicators of financial development show coefficients that are significant at the ten percent level. The coefficients, however, are smaller than the OLS coefficients and the TSLS results are very close to those obtained by RZ. 13 These results therefore suggest that better-developed financial intermediaries and markets ameliorate market frictions and thereby promote the growth of industries that rely more heavily on external finance.
Financial Structure and Industry Growth
We now turn to the question of whether a specific structure of the financial system -bank-based or market-based --enhances growth of these industries.
The results in Table 5 indicate that the financial structure does not have an independent impact on industrial growth patterns across countries. Although the interaction terms with all measures of financial structure show coefficients that are significant at the five-percent level in the OLS regressions, these results are not confirmed by the instrumental variable regressions.
The results in Table 6 are consistent with the financial services view, but inconsistent with the bank-based and market-based views. Specifically, we find that when controlling for the level of financial development, the interaction of external dependence and financial structure does not have a significant impact on industrial growth patterns across countries. 14 Whereas the interaction terms with all indicators of financial development are significant at the five-percent level, none of the interaction terms with our financial structure measure is significant. These results provide evidence in favor of the financial services view but inconsistent with both the bank-based and market-based views. 15 The results in Table 7 provide evidence that is consistent with the law and finance view. To evaluate the law and finance view we replace our indicators of financial development with Creditor, Anti-director and
Rule of Law. 16 To test for the joint significance of these legal variables, we include an F-test of the three interaction terms. While none of the interaction terms of our financial structure variables is significant, the interaction terms of the three legal variables are jointly significant. The p-values for the individual interaction terms indicate that it is especially the enforcement of investor rights that explains industrial growth patterns across countries.
Financial Structure and the Sources of Industry Growth
We now decompose the industry growth rates into two components: the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in the average size of establishments. The creation of new establishments is more likely to depend on external funds than the expansion of existing establishments, which can be financed with internal resources. The decomposition of industry growth therefore provides both a robustness test of the previous results and a more detailed exploration of the mechanisms through which financial development and financial structure influence industrial growth patterns across countries.
Again, the results in Table 8 support the financial services view and contradict both the bank-based and market-based views. The results indicate that overall financial development increases the growth in the number of establishments in industries that are dependent on external finance. However, distinguishing by whether a country is bank-based or market-based does not help explain the emergence of new establishments. The results in Table 9 indicate that neither financial development nor structure helps explain the growth rate of the average size of establishments across countries. Table 10 provides evidence consistent with the law and finance view. The legal determinants of financial development can explain industry patterns in the growth in the number of establishments. The legal component of financial development, however, does not explain a significant amount of the variation in the growth of the average size of establishments across countries. Again, the market-based versus bank-based distinction does not help significantly in accounting for industrial performance.
In sum, these results indicate that the overall level of financial development and its legal determinants help externally dependent industries grow faster by enabling the start-up of new firms and not through the expansion of existing ones. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that financial development enhances economic growth by allowing new firms and projects to develop. These results are also consistent with previous studies that show that financial development enhances economic growth through a better resource allocation and not through capital accumulation Wurgler 2000 ].
Extensions
This section extends the analyses by examining broader, more complex approaches to financial structure. We study (1) whether the optimal mix of banks and markets for funding industry and promoting firm formation depends on the level of economic development, (2) whether financial structure influences labor-intensive industries differently from capital-intensive ones, (3) whether financial structure influences R&D-intensive industries differently from other industries, and (4) whether the mix of bank and markets influences the efficiency of capital allocation between industries in a country by using Wurlger's (2000) recent estimates. In the analyses, we present the results using the aggregate index of financial structure. We do this to save space on tables since we obtain the same results on financial structure using the other measures. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to encompass an additional concept of financial structure.
Specifically, we examine the impact of public ownership of banks on the external funding of industries, new firm formation, the funding of labor-intensive industries, investment in R&D-intensive industries, and the efficiency of capital allocation.
Economic Development, Industry Growth, and New Firm Formation
This subsection assesses whether the impact of financial structure on industrial growth and new firm formation depends on the level of economic development. Gerschenkron (1962) , Boot and Thakor (1997) , Boyd and Smith (1998) , and Rajan and Zingales (1999) all suggest that bank-based systems maybe particularly important for economic performance in under-developed economies with poorly functioning institutions. Then, as countries develop and institutions improve, equity markets play an increasingly important and necessary role. To assess this view empirically, we modify the basic equation by adding an extra term that interacts three variables: external dependence, financial structure, and a dummy variable that takes on the value zero for all countries classified by the World Bank as high or upper-middle-income and one otherwise ("low-income"). Thus, the coefficient on the "simple" interaction term -the term that only interacts external dependence with financial structure -gives the impact of financial structure on industry growth patterns in high-and upper middle-income countries. The summation of the coefficients on (a) the "simple" interaction term and (b) the extra interaction term of external dependence, financial structure, and the dummy variable for low-income countries gives the impact of financial structure on industry growth in low-income countries. Thus, if the summation of the two interaction terms is negative and significant, then this provides empirical support for the Gerschenkron-hypothesis that banks are especially important in developing economies. We conduct the same analysis in the new firm regressions to assess whether bank-based-or market-based-systems are particularly important for new firm formation in developing countries.
We find no support for the view that bank-based systems are particularly important for industrial growth or new firm formation in developing economies (Tables 11 and 12 , regression 1). The simple interaction term of external dependence and financial structure does not enter significantly at the five-percent level. Moreover, the summation of (a) the coefficient on the simple interaction term and (b) the coefficient on the interaction term of external dependence, financial structure, and the low-income dummy is insignificant. (Specifically, the p-value of the F-test that the summation is zero equals 0.989 for the regression of industry growth rate and 0.704 for the regression of the growth in number of firms.) It is also important to note that we continue to find that industries that are heavily dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with a higher level of overall financial development. We also continue to find that overall financial development stimulates the establishment of new firms.
Public Banks, Industrial Growth, and New Firm Formation
We next examine whether public ownership of banks influences industrial growth patterns and the establishment of new firms. Publicly owned banks may allocate resources based on political considerations.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) show that government ownership of banks hurts overall financial development with negative implications on economic growth. Moreover, their paper suggests a broader conception of "financial structure" that includes ownership. We, therefore, test whether externally dependent industries grow more slowly in economies that are dominated by publicly owned banks.
Furthermore, we assess whether public ownership influences new firm formation. Specifically, we replace the interaction term of external dependence and financial structure with the interaction term of external dependence and the share of public bank assets in total banking assets (Public Share), which we obtain from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) . 17 If this interaction term enters negatively, then this suggests that public ownership hurts the growth of firms that depend heavily on external finance.
We find that industries that rely heavily on external finance do not grow more slowly in financial systems dominated by public banks when controlling for overall financial development (Table 11, regression 2). We continue to find that overall financial development positively influences the financing of externally dependent firms. Since public ownership of banks hurts overall financial development, our findings are consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's (2000) analyses: public ownership of banks hinders financial development with negative ramifications on economic performance. There is not a statistically significant link between public ownership and new firm formation (Table 12 , regression 2).
Labor Intensive Industries
Some theories suggest that publicly owned banks -as government institutions -favor labor-intensive industries rather than allocating credit based purely on efficiency considerations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000) . This paper tests whether more labor-intensive industries grow faster in financial systems characterized by high levels of public ownership of banks. Thus, we change the nature of the regression. Instead of distinguishing industries by external dependence, we distinguish industries by labor intensity. 18 We find that labor-intensive industries grow faster in financial systems that are dominated by public banks (Table 11 , regression 3). This is consistent with the view that government-owned banks consider employment when making credit allocation decisions. We do not, however, find a significant link between public bank ownership and new firm formation (Table 12 , regression 3).
Besides the link between public banks and labor-intensive industries, we also examine whether bank-based financial systems favor labor-intensive industries. As suggested by LLSV (1999), powerful states may favor bank-based systems because it is easier to influence bank loan decisions than to influence the credit decisions of atomistic, competitive markets. One possible manifestation of this influence is that bank-based systems favor labor-intensive industries. We do not, however, find that labor-intensive industries grow faster in bank-based systems (Table 11 , regression 4). Moreover, we do not find a strong connection between financial structure and new firm formation in labor-intensive industries (Table 12 , regression 4).
This finding does not reject the view that powerful states favor bank-based systems. These findings do suggest, however, that labor-intensive industries do not perform much differently in bank-based or market-based systems.
R&D Intensive Industries
A number of models predict that market-based systems are particularly important for new firms with intangible capital (Allen, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1999) . To assess this view, this paper examines whether R&D intensive industries enjoy greater success and more rapid firm formation in countries with market-based financial systems. We also examine whether R&D intensive industries grow faster and enjoy faster firm creation in countries with a smaller share of publicly owned banks. Specifically, we change the basic equation. For the structure regressions, we replace external dependence with R&D-intensity, so that we include the interaction term of R&D-intensity and financial structure; for the publicly owned bank regressions, we include the interaction term of R&D intensity and the share of public bank ownership. It is imperative to emphasize that the number of observations is much lower in the R&D-intensity regressions (about 300) than in the standard regressions used thus far (typically greater than 1000), which may reduce confidence in the R&D findings. 19 As reported (Tables 11 and 12 , regressions 5 and 6), we do not find that R&D intensive industries enjoy faster growth and more rapid firm creation in countries with market-based financial systems, nor do we find that R&D intensive industries grow faster and have faster firm formation in countries with a smaller share of publicly owned banks.
Capital Allocation, Financial Structure, and Public Banks
A fundamental role of financial systems is to allocate capital to growing industries and reduce the flow of capital to declining industries. Wurgler (2000) computes the elasticity of industry investment to industry-value added across 28-industries in 65 countries. Specifically, Wurgler (2000) computes an overall elasticity of the degree to which countries invest more in growing industries and invest less in declining ones.
We refer to this as the Wurgler index. Wurgler (2000) also computes separate elasticities of increasing investment in growing industries and a second elasticity for declining investment in declining industries. We refer to these as the Wurgler Growing and Wurgler Declining indices respectively. This paper uses these three elasticity estimates to test whether financial structure is associated with the efficiency of capital allocation. Thus, these regressions are pure cross-country regressions since Wurgler uses cross-industry regressions in each country to compute the elasticity indices for each country. Table 13 shows that market-based financial systems do not have greater investment elasticities than more bank-based systems when controlling for overall financial development. The results suggest that financial structure does not exert an independent effect on the efficiency of capital allocation per se. Overall financial development, however, remains significantly, positively linked with the efficiency of capital allocation when controlling for financial structure. We find that financially developed economies expand investment in their growing industries and reduce investment in their shrinking industries, which is consistent with Wurgler's (2000) findings.
Table 13 also shows that financial systems dominated by publicly owned banks do not have worse investment elasticities than privately owned systems when controlling for overall financial development.
Overall financial development remains positively linked with the efficiency of capital allocation. These results are consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) and Wurgler (2000) : public banks hurt overall financial development and overall financial development exerts a positive impact on the efficiency of capital allocation.
Robustness Tests 20
This section assesses the robustness of the core results to alternative measures of financial structure, financial development, and external dependence. First, recognizing that there is not a universally accepted definition of bank-based versus market-based, we decided to isolate those countries with extremely bank-based or market-based systems. Perhaps, very "unbalanced" financial systems are robustly linked with industrial performance, even though continuous measures used thus far are not. We construct three additional variables. (2000) on the share of public ownership in the commercial banking sector, we construct two new measures of (1) credit to the private sector by privately owned deposit money banks and (2) credit to the private sector by privately owned financial intermediaries. 23 We then recalculate all our indicators of overall financial development and financial structure using these measures. 24 These new measures confirm our earlier findings: Neither bank-nor market-based systems have a robust link with the growth patterns of externally dependent industries, new firm creation, or existing firm expansion. The results strongly support the law and finance view. In sum, these additional measures of financial development and structure do not alter the paper's findings.
Third, we also confirmed our results using two alternative measures of financial structure proposed
by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2000) . Specifically, we regress Value Traded on Rule of Law, the British legal origin dummy, the inflation rate and Anti-Director. 25 The residuals of this regression reflect the component of stock market development not predicted by the legal and macroeconomic environment.
Similarly, we regress Bank Credit on Rule of Law, the British legal origin dummy, the inflation rate and
Creditor. Positive residuals from these two regressions, which we call Excess-Market and Excess-Bank, indicate stock market and banking sector development that goes beyond the predicted development. We then include interaction terms of external dependence with both residual series in our regressions. A positive coefficient on either interaction term would indicate that externally dependent industries grow faster in countries in which the stock market or banks are larger than predicted by the legal or macroeconomic environment. Neither of these alternative measures of financial structure enters significantly in the regressions, therefore providing additional support for the law and finance view.
Fourth, we assessed the robustness of the results using three alternative measures of external dependence. The three alternative measures of external dependence are significantly correlated with our principal measure of external dependence at the one-percent level, with correlation coefficients being at least 60%. We first use the dependence on external finance of firms that went public during the previous ten years. RZ show that the demand for external finance is highest during the early years of a company. Using a sample of young firms to calculate the dependence on external finance might therefore give a more appropriate picture of the need for external finance. Using the external dependence of young firms does not alter our main result: financial structure does not robustly explain industrial growth patterns, new firm formation, or old firm expansion. When using young firms to define external dependence, there are some specifications in which overall financial development enters insignificantly. However, using the external dependence of young firms lends particularly strong support to the law and finance view. This paper's conclusions are also robust to using the second alternative measure of external dependence. This measure is calculated over the period 1970-79. If countries other than the U.S. use older technologies, the external dependence as measured over the 80s might not reflect well the needs for external finance in other countries, especially developing countries. We therefore rerun the regressions using the external dependence measured over the 70s. Since the U.S. was also "more" bank-based in the 70s than in 80s, using this historic measure of external dependence has another advantage. It allows us to test the sensitivity of our results to a bias that might have been introduced by using the external dependence of industries measured for a sample of firms in a market-based economy. Our results are similar to the ones obtained with our principal measure of external finance, as measured over the 80s. There is not a robust link between financial structure and industrial growth patterns, but overall financial development and the component of overall financial development explained by the legal environment help explain industrial growth patterns, especially the formation of new firms.
Finally, our previous results concerning financial development and financial structure are not due to peculiar characteristics of industries in the U.S. The third alternative measure of external dependence is calculated for a sample of Canadian firms, which RZ note is the only other country for which firm-level flow of funds are available. We confirm our results concerning financial structure. However, using the Canadian data, we cannot confirm the results concerning the law and finance view and the results on the financial services view are weakened. These results might be partly explained by the fact that we have data for only 27 industries in the Canadian sample, whereas there are at least 36 industries in the text specification.
Furthermore, the sample size drops from 1222 to 702. Thus, with some qualifications, the robustness checks confirm the text's main conclusions: (1) industries that are heavily dependent on external finance do not grow faster in bank-based or market-based financial system, (2) externally dependent industries do, however, tend to grow faster in countries with better-developed financial systems and especially in economies that efficiently protect the legal rights of outside investors, and (3) overall financial development and the legal protection of investors stimulates industry growth primarily by facilitating new firm formation.
Conclusions
This paper examined the following questions: Do industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in bank-based or market-based systems? Are new firms more likely to form in a bank-based or market-based financial system? Alternatively, is it the overall level of financial development or the legal system that explains industrial growth patterns and the emergence of new firms across countries?
The results do not provide support for either the bank-based or the market-based view. Measuring whether a country is bank-based or market-based does not help explain industrial growth patterns. The results do indicate, however, that industries that are heavy users of external finance grow faster in countries with higher overall levels of financial development and in countries that rigorously protect the rights of outside investors. Moreover, the findings show that the overall level of financial development along with strong creditor rights, shareholder rights, and contract enforcement mechanisms foster new firm formation.
Together, these findings provide support for the financial-services and law and finance views.
references regarding the relative merits of bank-and market-based financial systems in fostering economic performance.
1 Banks may reduce the costs of screening and monitoring firms and thereby improve corporate control [Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986] . Furthermore, banks frequently establish close relations with firms that ease cash-flow constraints on existing firm expansion [Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991] . 2 Researchers advance additional arguments in favor of bank-based systems. In liquid markets, investors can inexpensively sell their shares and consequently may have fewer incentives to expend resources monitoring managers [Bhide 1993 ]. Stiglitz (1985) argues that efficient markets reduce incentives for individuals to research firms because any new information they uncover is quickly reflected in public stock prices before the individual can exploit the fruits of the research. Bank-based systems mitigate this problem since banks reveal less information in public markets [Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor 1993] . Also, efficient markets may minimize the effectiveness of takeovers. Atomistic shareholders have incentives to capture the benefits from a takeover by holding their shares instead of tendering them, thus making takeover attempts less profitable and less useful as a control device [Grossman and Hart, 1980] . Also, corporate control through outside takeover threats may face similar limitations because insiders have greater information than outsiders. Finally, incestuous relationships frequently flourish between management and boards of directors, which may induce directors and management to collude against other shareholders . 3 For a review of the literature on the positive role of markets, see Levine and Zervos (1998) . 4 We do not include Financial Development or Financial Structure on their own, since we focus on within-country, across-industry growth rates. 5 This does not correspond exactly to the convergence concept known from cross-country growth regressions. We include the share in manufacturing rather than the level, since we focus on within-country, across-industry growth rates. As in RZ, γ enters significantly negative in most regressions. 6 Where possible we also ran regressions using only legal origin as instrumental variables, with very similar results. 7 Levine and Zervos (1998) point out a potential pitfall of Value Traded. If forward-looking stock markets anticipate large corporate profits and therefore higher economic growth, this will boost stock prices and therefore boost Value Traded. Thus, a positive relationship between Value Traded and growth might reflect a spurious correlation due to this price effect. This price effect, however, does not arise in our model, since we focus on within-country, across-industry growth rates. If markets anticipate higher growth in one industry, the resulting larger value of Value Traded would be the same for all industries in this country. Moreover, when we use the turnover ratio, which equals value traded divided by market capitalization, we get the same results. Turnover does not suffer from this price effect because stock prices enter into the numerator and denominator. 8 For evidence on the impact of financial intermediation on growth, see Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) . For evidence on the impact of stock markets on growth, see Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) . 9 Instead of using the sum of the different creditor and minority shareholder rights, we also used principal component indicators, and obtained the same results. 10 There are no cross-country data available on firms. An establishment is defined as a "unit that engages, under a single ownership or control, in one, or predominantly one, kind of activity at a single location." The growth in the number of establishments (average size of establishment) is defined as the log difference of the number of establishments (value added in the industry divided by number of establishments) at the beginning and the end of the period. 11 The growth differential is calculated as follows: 1.553*0.368 (External dependence of machinery minus external dependence of beverages)*3.962(Finance-Activity in Malaysia minus Finance-Activity in Greece). 12 Since Finance-Dummy is a binary variable, we do not instrument for Finance-Dummy. 13 In the following we will only present the TSLS results. The OLS regressions yield similar results. 14 While Levine and Zervos (1998) find evidence that stock markets and banks enhance economic growth through different channels, Levine (2000b) and this paper test the hypothesis that the composition of the financial sector matters for economic growth. These two questions are complementary and not conflicting. For instance, if we had found a statistically significant parameter on financial structure, δ 2 (significantly positive or negative), this would not have invalidated the results obtained by Levine and Zervos (1998) . This result would have indicated that market-based systems (or bank-based systems) are more conducive to the growth of financially dependent industries and the emergence of new firms. This result, however, would not necessarily imply that banks (or markets) do not have a positive impact on economic growth. 15 Alternatively, we could use these legal indicators as instruments to thus extract the exogenous component of financial development explained by these legal rights and their enforcement. The results are similar to the ones reported here. 16 We use the average of government ownership in 1995 and pre-privatization. Both measures are constructed as the percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the government divided by the total assets of the banking sector. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) for details. 17 We calculate U.S. labor intensity data by dividing wages and salaries paid to employees by value added, and obtain this data from the UNIDO database on three digit industries over the period 1980-89. 18 The R&D-intensity variable equals the share of R&D expenses in value added for U.S. industries over the period 1980-89 and was obtained from the OECD's Main Industrial Indicators database. The reduction in observations occurs because of a different industry split in the OECD from that in the RZ data. 19 These results are available on request in Appendix B. 20 Austria, Chile, Denmark, Finland, and Portugal are classified as having unbalanced bank-based systems. 21 Australia, Brazil, India, New Zealand and Sweden are classified as having unbalanced market-based systems. 22 Specifically, we multiply the measures discussed above by one minus the share of publicly owned commercial banks. The correlations between our two new measures and the original ones are 88% and 92%, respectively. 23 Although the public share refers only to commercial banks, we assume that the nonbank financial sector presents a similar ownership structure for each country. 24 Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2000) show that inflation tends to reduce stock market liquidity and banking sector activity. Industry's real growth = annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90.
Industry's growth in number of firms = log-difference between number of establishments in 1990 and 1980
Industry's growth in average size of firms = log-difference between industry's value added divided by number of establishments in 1990 and 1980 The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country.
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. The differential in real growth rate indicates how much faster an industry at the 75th percentile of external dependence grows with respect to an industry at the 25th percentile level in a country at the 75th percentile of the respective measure of financial development compared to a country at the 25th percentile.
We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies as instruments for financial development in the TSLS regressions.
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size Finance-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 0 if total value traded as share of GDP and claims on private sector by financial intermediaries as share of GDP are less than the respective sample mean, 1 otherwise The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country.
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies as instruments for financial structure in the TSLS regressions.
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size Structure-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if Structure-Aggregate is above the median, 0 otherwise The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. The dependent variable is the log difference between the number of establishments in 1990 and 1980 for each industry in each country. The dependent variable is the log difference between the average size of establishments in 1990 and 1980 for each industry in each country.
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. All regressions are TSLS. We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant population in total population as instruments for financial development and financial structure. The dependent variable is the log difference in the number of establishment ( The dependent variable is the log difference in the number of establishment between 1990 and 1980. The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Wurger = elasticity of investment from declining to growing value added industries.
Wurgler Growing = elasticity of investment in growing industries.
Wurgler Declining = elasticity of investment in declining industries.
Wurgler ( 
